Sect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own
judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong
obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him
into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and
language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was
between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents
and children; to which, in time, that between master and servant
came to be added: and though all these might, and commonly did meet
together, and make up but one family, wherein the master or mistress
of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each of these, or
all together, came short of political society, as we shall
see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of
these.
Sect. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact
between man and woman; and tho' it consist chiefly in such a
communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to its
chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support and
assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary not only
to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to their
common off-spring, who have a right to be nourished, and maintained
by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.
Sect. 79. For the end of conjunction between male and female,
being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the species;
this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last, even after
procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support
of the young ones, who are to be sustained even after procreation,
so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young
ones, who are to be sustained by those that got them, till they are
able to shift and provide for themselves. This rule, which the
infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands, we find the
inferior creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous animals which
feed on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts no
longer than the very act of copulation; because the teat of the dam
being sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on
grass, the male only begets, but concerns not himself for the female
or young, to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing. But in
beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the dam
not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her numerous
off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more
dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the assistance of
the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family,
which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but
by the joint care of male and female. The same is to be observed in
all birds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses
the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose
young needing food in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates,
till the young are able to use their wing, and provide for
themselves.
Sect. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only
reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer
conjunction than other creatures, viz. because the female
is capable of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with child
again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before the former is
out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able to
shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his
parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he
hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society
with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young being
able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation
returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are
at liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season
summons them again to chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire
the wisdom of the great Creator, who having given to man foresight,
and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to supply the
present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man
and wife should be more lasting, than of male and female amongst
other creatures; that so their industry might be encouraged, and
their interest better united, to make provision and lay up goods for
their common issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent
solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb.
Sect. 81. But tho' these are ties upon mankind, which make
the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the
other species of animals; yet it would give one reason to enquire,
why this compact, where procreation and education are secured, and
inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable, either by
consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well
as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity in the
nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be
for life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive
law, which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual.
Sect. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one
common concern, yet having different understandings, will
unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being
necessary that the last determination, i.e. the rule, should
be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man's share, as the
abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the things of their
common interest and property, leaves the wife in the full and free
possession of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the
husband no more power over her life than she has over his; the
power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute
monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to
separate from him, where natural right, or their contract allows
it; whether that contract be made by themselves in the state of
nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live in; and
the children upon such separation fall to the father or mother's
lot, as such contract does determine.
Sect. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be
obtained under politic government, as well as in the state of
nature, the civil magistrate cloth not abridge the right or power of
either naturally necessary to those ends, viz. procreation
and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together; but only
decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about
them. If it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and
power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were
necessary to the society between man and wife, there could be
no matrimony in any of those countries where the husband is allowed
no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring no
such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal society
put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state.
Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it;
nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance
and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society,
might be varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and
wife in that society, as far as may consist with procreation and the
bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves;
nothing being necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the
ends for which it is made.
Sect. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and
the distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them, I
have treated of so largely, in the foregoing chapter, that I shall
not here need to say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that
it is far different from a politic society.
Sect. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history,
but given to those of far different condition; for a freeman makes
himself a servant to another, by selling him, for a certain time,
the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to
receive: and though this commonly puts him into the family of his
master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the
master but a temporary power over him, and no greater than what is
contained in the contract between them. But there is another
sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves,
who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature
subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their
masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with
it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the
state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that
state be considered as any part of civil society; the chief
end whereof is the preservation of property.
Sect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family
with all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants,
and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family;
which, what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices,
and number too, with a little common-wealth, yet is very far from
it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be
thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute
monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and
short power, when it is plain, by what has been said before, that
the master of the family has a very distinct and differently
limited power, both as to time and extent, over those several
persons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is
as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great,
whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no
legislative power of life and death over any of them, and none too
but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. And
he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family,
who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how
a family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is
properly political society, we shall best see, by considering
wherein political society itself consists.
Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to
perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and
privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or
number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to
preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate,
against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and
punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the
offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the
heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no
political society can be, nor subsist, without having in
itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto,
punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there
only is political society, where every one of the members
hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of
the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for
protection to the law established by it. And thus all private
judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community
comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the
same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community,
for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that
may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter
of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath
committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has
established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are
not, in political society together. Those who are united into
one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal
to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish
offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those
who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the
state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for
himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed it, the
perfect state of nature.
Sect. 88. And thus the common-wealth comes by a power to set down
what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which
they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that
society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it
has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members, by
any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;)
and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members
of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has
entered into civil society, and is become a member of any
commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish offences,
against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private
judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up
to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the
magistrate, he has given a right to the common-wealth to employ his
force, for the execution of the judgments of the common-wealth,
whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own
judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And
herein we have the original of the legislative and
executive power of civil society, which is to judge by
standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when committed
within the common-wealth; and also to determine, by occasional
judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far
injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to
employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.
Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united
into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the
law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only
is a political, or civil society. And this is done,
where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into
society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme
government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates
with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the
society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws
for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the
execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is
due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into
that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with
authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the
injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which
judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And
where-ever there are any number of men, however associated, that
have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in
the state of nature.
Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy,
which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is
indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form
of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society,
being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of
nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his
own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of
that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy
that may arise, and which every one of the* society ought to obey;
where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal
to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those
persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every
absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his
dominion.
(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained
in the same society; and the principal use of that power is, to give
laws unto all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must
obey, unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce,
that the law of reason, or of God, doth enjoin the contrary,
Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and
executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no
appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and
with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress
may be expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered
from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however
intitled, Czar, or Grand Signior, or how you please,
is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as
he is with therest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who
have no standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for
the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they
are still in the state of nature, and under all the
inconveniencies of it,* with only this woful difference to
the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in
the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his
right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now,
whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his
monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought to
have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational
creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right;
and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man
can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is
yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power.
(*To take away all such mutual grievances,
injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in the state of
nature, there was no way but only by growing into composition and
agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of govemment
public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom
they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace,
tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men
always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be
defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek their
own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was
not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be
withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon
him to determine his own right, and according to his own
determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every
man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial;
and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except
they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they
should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason
that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another,
Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power
purifies men's bloods, and corrects the baseness of human
nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be
convinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent and
injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much
better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be
found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the
sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what
the protection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers
of their countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of
happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of
government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late
relation of Ceylon, may easily see.
Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies
indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects have
an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and
restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects
themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary,
and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society
and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this
be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we
owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no
more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or
greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from
hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only for
his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any
love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit
they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence
is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of
this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. They
are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after
safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be
measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and security: but
as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is
above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt
and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be
guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand
is to do it, is presently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if
when men quitting the state of nature entered into society, they
agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of
laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state
of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity.
This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to
avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or
foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by
lions.
Sect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to
amuse people's understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and
when they perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out of
the bounds of the civil society which they are of, and that they
have no appeal on earth against any harm, they may receive from him,
they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, in respect
of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as they
can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for
which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into
it. And therefore, though perhaps at first , (as shall be shewed
more at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse)
some one good and excellent man having got a pre -eminency amongst
the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to
a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration
of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands,
without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his
uprightness and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as
some men would persuade us) sacredness of customs, which the
negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had
brought in successors of another stamp, the people finding their
properties not secure under the government, as then it was, (whereas
government has no other end but the preservation of property) could
never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society,
till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call
them senate, parliament, or what you please.* By which means every
single person became subject, equally with other the meanest men, to
those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had
established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the
force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of superiority
plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of
any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted
from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit,
and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any
harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly still in the
state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil
society; unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil
society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any
one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.
(*At the first, when some certain kind of
regiment was once appointed, it may be that nothing was then farther
thought upon for the manner of goveming, but all permitted unto
their wisdom and discretion, which were to rule, till by experience
they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing
which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the
sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one
man's will, became the cause of all men's misery. This
constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their
duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them.
Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(**Civil law being the act of the whole body
politic, cloth therefore over-rule each several part of the same
body. Hooker, ibid.)
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